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What Drives Security Issuance Decisions: Market Timing, Pecking Order, or Both? 
 
We study market timing and pecking order in a sample of debt and equity issues and share 
repurchases of Canadian firms from 1998 to 2007. We find that only when firms are not financially 
constrained is there evidence that firms issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued 
(undervalued) and evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower post-announcement long-run returns. 
Similarly, we find that only when firms are not overvalued do they prefer debt to equity financing. 
These findings highlight an interaction between market timing and pecking order effects. 
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 Two important theories regarding security issuance are the market timing theory 
(Stein, 1996) and the pecking order theory (Donaldson, 1961).
1
 According to the market 
timing theory, managers are able to time the market and issue equity when the stock of the 
firm is overvalued and repurchase equity when it is undervalued. The pecking order theory 
argues that due to the higher costs of equity issuance, firms will prefer debt to equity 
financing, and firms will issue equity only when they are financially constrained.
2
 These 
theories have received mixed support from the prior literature, but to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no papers that have tested for interactions between these theories. Our 
paper seeks to fill this gap by examining the interaction between market timing and financial 
constraints. 
The idea whether companies time the market in their financing policy remains 
controversial in the literature. Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) find evidence inconsistent with 
market timing. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) show only a limited effect of market 
timing on equity issuance, while other papers indicate that firms time the market with public 
equity issues (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Gomes and Phillips, 2007). Even though most 
papers find that overvaluation (typically measured by the market-to-book ratio) negatively 
predicts post-issue stock performance, the result is also potentially consistent with an 
investment-based “rational” theory in which firms exercise growth options through equity 
issuance. Lower post-issue stock returns reflect a decrease in firm risk as risky growth 
options are converted into less risky assets (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2006; Li, 
                                                     
1
 Other important theories include the information asymmetry model of Myers and Majluf (1984) and the static 
trade-off theory. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that external financing is costly because of information 
asymmetry between management and outside investors. Since equity involves a greater level of information 
asymmetry than debt, firms should prefer debt to equity. The static trade-off theory argues that firms trade off 
the advantages of debt, such as the deductibility of interest costs from corporate taxes, against the advantages of 
equity, such as lower expected bankruptcy costs. This paper only focuses on the pecking order and market 
timing theories. 
2
 In some parts of the finance literature, the theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) is included as part of the pecking 
order theory because the information asymmetry theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) implies the same financing 
hierarchy. In this paper, we limit the pecking order theory to the following specific version: due do the higher 
financing costs of equity issuance, firms prefer debt to equity issuance, and equity is used only when firms are 
so financially constrained that they cannot take up additional debt (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
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Livdan, and Zhang, 2009). Similarly, the evidence regarding the pecking order theory is 
rather mixed (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Fama and French, 
2005; Lemmon and Zender, 2010). See Section I for a more detailed review of these theories. 
In this paper, we take a different approach and investigate the effects of market timing 
and pecking order simultaneously. There are several reasons for examining the interaction 
between market timing and financial constraints. First, the effect of market timing on security 
issuance should be conditional on the degree of financial constraints. Companies that intend 
to issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued (undervalued) may not be able 
to do so if they do not have the financial flexibility. In other words, market timing is only 
feasible when firms are less financially constrained. Consequently, according to the market 
timing theory, equity valuation should negatively predict post-announcement stock 
performance especially for financially unconstrained issuers. Additionally, the effect of the 
pecking order may be conditional on equity valuation. If the shares of the firm are 
overvalued, the incentive to issue overvalued equity may dominate any effect suggested by 
the pecking order. Put differently, a financially unconstrained firm is expected to use debt 
financing according to the pecking order, but if the firm is overvalued, it may choose to issue 
equity instead. Moreover, uncovering such an interaction should help rule out “rational” 
theory interpretations as opposed to market timing as rational theories do not have an 
implication on the interaction between abnormal stock performance and financial constraints. 
For example, rational theories do not predict that post-announcement abnormal stock returns 
would be different for firms with different levels of financial constraints. 
Our empirical tests are conducted on a sample of security issues by Canadian firms. 
Most of the empirical evidence for market timing and pecking order is based on US studies, 
and a study of the Canadian market will provide a useful clue as to how general these theories 
really are. While the Canadian and US capital markets are substantially integrated, there are 
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also important differences. For example, Canadian companies are usually closely held, 
whereas ownership of US companies tends to be more widely dispersed. In fact, most stock 
markets, including the large markets in continental Europe, tend to have shares that are 
closely held. A priori it might be expected that in markets where stocks are closely held, there 
is less information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. In turn, this would imply 
that it may be more difficult for managers to profit from stock misvaluations. In contrast, it 
can be argued that there is generally less publicly available information in Canada as 
compared to the US giving rise to more room for stock misvaluation. 
We study the security issuance decisions using a sample of Canadian firms that issued 
equity or debt, or repurchased shares from 1998 to 2007. To test for the interaction between 
market timing and financial constraints, we use the market-to-book equity ratio (MB) to 
measure stock valuation, and employ a measure of financial constraints (the KZ-index) 
developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and used by other authors (Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler, 2003; Chang, Tam, Tan, and Wong, 2007). After confirming the finding in prior 
literature that equity issuers have higher MB ratios than debt issuers or repurchasers, we 
focus on the key relation between pre-announcement MB and post-announcement stock 
returns and how this relationship depends upon the KZ-index. 
We examine both the announcement period (three-day) and long run (three-month) 
stock returns after the announcement since short run market reactions may be inadequate to 
reflect the full extent of the pre-issue market valuation of the issuers. Indeed, we find that 
short run announcement period returns do not lead to a robust conclusion regarding the 
correlation between market performance and market-to-book. However, an analysis of the 
longer run post-announcement stock price performance reveals a stark contrast between the 
issuers. Equity issuers perform the worst, followed by debt issuers, with equity repurchasers 
outperforming the market. For equity issuers, the mean market-adjusted return in the period 
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of 2 to 60 days after an equity issue announcement is 0.95% for firms with a low MB ratio 
and is -14.66% for firms with high a MB ratio. The difference between these two subsamples 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the market timing 
hypothesis, but also admit the rational theory interpretation that issuers should earn lower 
post-announcement returns when high risk growth options are converted into low risk assets. 
We further distinguish hypotheses by splitting the sample into high and low KZ firms 
(a high KZ-index indicates more financial constraints). We sort our sample into 16 (4 × 4) 
MB-KZ portfolios based on pre-announcement MB and KZ values, and examine the post-
announcement size-MB style-adjusted buy-and-hold returns. We find that the effect of MB 
on long run abnormal returns is primarily among low KZ issuers. For example, consider the 
zero investment hedge strategy that goes long on the low MB portfolio and short on the high 
MB portfolio. This hedge strategy has a mean three-month style-adjusted return of 11.2% 
(statistically significant at the 5% level) among low KZ firms, compared to a statistically 
non-significant 4.3% among high KZ firms. Moreover, in multivariate regressions, we 
confirm the finding that that high MB predicts lower style-adjusted long run returns only 
among low KZ issuers. These results give stronger support for the market timing theory. 
We also examine the effect of misvaluation and financial constraints on security 
issuance choice decisions. We assess whether MB and KZ affect the choice between equity 
and debt issuance and the choice between equity issuance and equity repurchase  in 
multinomial probit regressions that control for factors including firm size and information 
asymmetry. We find that MB increases the probability of issuing equity versus issuing debt, 
but this relationship is robust only when the interaction between KZ and MB is controlled for. 
Overvalued firms (with high MB) are more likely to issue equity only when they are not 
financially constrained. Similarly, undervalued firms (with low MB) are more likely to 
repurchase equity only when they are not financially constrained. With respect to the pecking 
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order theory, we find that KZ increases the probability of equity issuance versus debt 
issuance, but only when MB is low. This result indicates that a high degree of financial 
constraints makes firms more likely to issue equity as compared to debt consistent with the 
pecking order prediction, but only when firms are not overvalued. 
In sum, we find that the issuing firm’s valuation negatively predicts post-
announcement abnormal returns only when the firm is financially unconstrained lending 
support for the market timing theory rather than the investment-based rational theory. 
Moreover, when firms are not financially constrained, they are more likely to issue 
(repurchase) equity when they are overvalued (undervalued), and the pecking order 
prediction that a lower degree of financial constraints increases the probability of debt 
financing is more likely to be observed among undervalued firms. These results highlight the 
importance to account for the interaction between market timing and pecking order when we 
assess the validity of these theories in security issuance. To our knowledge, such an 
interaction effect on security issuance has not been documented in prior literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we discuss related 
research and develop hypotheses. Section II describes our sample and construction of proxies. 
Section III presents our empirical results with respect to the interaction between the market 
timing and pecking order effects on security issuance. Section IV provides our conclusions. 
 
I. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
A. Previous Research on Security Issuance 
There is a vast literature on security issuance. In this section, we provide a brief 
review of the papers most directly related to our hypotheses. Previous research finds that 
equity offers coincide with high market valuations of equity (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; 
Jung et al., 1996; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001). Baker and Wurgler (2002) confirm 
8 
that past market valuations have a strong and persistent effect on capital structure. Firms raise 
equity when the cost of equity is “unusually low” or market-to-book ratios (considered as a 
proxy for misvaluation) are extremely high. Gomes and Phillips (2007) find evidence for the 
market timing hypothesis. The probability of issuing equity increases with excess stock 
returns prior to the announcement when compared to the size-matched benchmark portfolio. 
Moreover, they determine that market timing is a particular characteristic of public equity 
markets. However, they do not examine post-issue stock performance. Therefore, alternative 
interpretations regarding prior stock returns cannot be excluded. Elliott, Koëter-Kant, and 
Warr (2008) use an earnings-based valuation model to test the market timing theory, and find 
that equity market mispricing plays an important role in the security choice decision. There is 
also evidence that managers repurchase equity when they believe their shares are undervalued 
(Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995). In contrast to the static trade-off theory, 
international evidence regarding market timing is quite limited.
3
 Henderson, Jegadeesh, and 
Weisbach (2006) find evidence of market timing with respect to equity and debt issuances in 
most of the countries in their sample. Bruinshoofd and de Haan (2007) test this theory for a 
sample of 45,000 observations from US, UK, and Continental European firms. They confirm 
that there are only a few market timing effects on the capital structure of European firms and 
that they are specific to information and communication technology (ICT) firms and the ICT 
boom episode. 
Other papers find little or no evidence of market timing. Jung et al. (1996) test 
whether market timing is of first-order importance in the security decisions of their sample 
firms from 1977 to 1984. They determine that although equity issuers have higher market-to-
book ratios and experience higher stock price run-ups prior to the announcement than debt 
issuers, the results are not consistent with the market timing explanation of capital structure. 
                                                     
3
 For international evidence on the static trade-off theory, see Ozkan (2001), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal 
(2008), and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2010). 
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The announcement date excess returns are more negative for firms that have lower market-to-
book ratios or that are less overvalued. There is no evidence that equity issues with higher 
market-to-book ratios have low post-issuance long run returns. DeAngelo et al. (2010) find 
that while equity issuers have a higher valuation as measured by the market-to-book ratio or 
post-issue long run return, overvaluation only has a marginal effect on the probability of 
issuing equity as compared to the near-term cash needs of the firm. Furthermore, even though 
most papers find that market-to-book negatively predicts post-issue long run stock returns, 
the interpretation is controversial. For example, Carlson et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2009) both 
suggest an investment-based “rational” theory. They argue that the pre-issue stock price run-
up reflects high growth opportunities. Managers issue equity to invest in those opportunities, 
and lower post-issue abnormal stock returns reflect a decrease in firm risk level as risky 
growth options are converted into less risky assets. 
According to the pecking order theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999), different financing options bear different financing costs and firms 
will prefer the least costly means of financing. Firms will only issue the costliest security 
(equity) when forced to (i.e., when firms are financially constrained). Previous research 
conducted in the US and UK markets (Hovakimian et al., 2001), primarily determines that 
equity is preferred to debt by smaller and riskier companies, those with better growth 
opportunities and lower leverage, and less profitable firms. These results are generally 
consistent with the pecking order. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also demonstrate support 
for the pecking order theory based on a sample of mature firms. De Jong, Verbeek, and 
Verwijmeren (2010) extend the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) model by separating the 
effects of financing surpluses, normal deficits, and large deficits. They find some evidence 
for a pecking order among large firms, but they also find that the model does not hold for 
small firms, which have the highest potential for asymmetric information. They also conclude 
10 
that the model has lost explanatory power over time. Other studies cast doubt on the pecking 
order theory. Helwege and Liang (1996) find little evidence of a pecking order from a sample 
of initial public offering (IPO) firms. Frank and Goyal (2003) report some evidence that large 
firms exhibit pecking order behavior, but their overall evidence goes against it, while Fama 
and French (2005) demonstrate that equity issues are very frequent and are typically not a 
result of duress as a last resort as predicted by the pecking order model. Lemmon and Zender 
(2010) find that debt appears to be preferred to equity financing in the absence of debt 
capacity concerns. 
The above empirical evidence is based on the standard (non-survey) literature. 
Overall, this literature documents a mixed support for market timing. The evidence regarding 
the pecking order theory is also rather controversial. More recently, new work has been 
conducted to use surveys to ask financial executives about theories of capital structure. 
Surveys among financial managers generally find that equity valuation is an important 
determinant in the decision to issue equity. In a well known study, Graham and Harvey 
(2001) find this to be the case for 67% of the US chief financial officers (CFOs) that they 
survey. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) conclude that 53% of European CFOs share this view and 
Brounen, de Jong, and Koedijk (2006) find this for 52% of the UK managers in their study.
4
 
With respect to the pecking order theory, the survey paper of Graham and Harvey 
(2001) finds that firms avoid equity when they perceive that it is undervalued. This view is 
consistent with the pecking order theory. However, they also determine that the importance 
of stock valuation on equity issuance is not related to information asymmetry. These results 
are confirmed in the European survey of Brounen et al. (2006). They also confirm that the 
                                                     
4
 Brounen et al. (2006) find lower numbers for CFOs from the Netherlands (39%), Germany (42%), and France 
(33%). They argue that the difference in the US and the UK is caused by the importance of public capital 
markets in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
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results are in line with the predictions of the pecking order theory, but that information 
asymmetries do not drive the pecking order. 
 
B. Hypotheses 
In this paper, we examine two possible explanations for security issuance decisions: 
1) market timing and 2) pecking order. We highlight the interaction between the two effects 
in the development of our hypotheses. 
 
1. Market Timing 
The market timing theory implies that companies issue equity when it is overvalued 
and repurchase equity when they are undervalued. Therefore, equity issuers should be more 
overvalued than debt issuers and stock repurchasers. As discussed below, we use the market-
to-book equity ratio (or allied variables such as Tobin’s Q) to measure valuation. The market 
timing hypothesis predicts that equity issuers should have a higher MB than debt issuers or 
repurchasers. However, as discussed in Chang, Hilary, Shih, and Tam (2010) and Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), MB and related variables (such as pre-issue stock 
returns) may also indicate growth opportunities and managerial skills. To distinguish market 
timing from alternative interpretations, we further examine stock performance around and 
after the announcement of financing decisions. According to market timing, overvalued 
(undervalued) firms should issue (repurchase) shares when they are overvalued 
(undervalued). As the market corrects the pre-announcement misvaluation after the issuance 
announcement, post-announcement stock returns should be lower (higher) for high MB (low 
MB) firms. 
We examine both the announcement period and long run stock returns after the 
announcement as short run market reactions may be inadequate to reflect the full extent of the 
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pre-announcement market valuation of the issuers. For example, the first day returns of IPOs 
tend to be high, but the long run returns of IPOs could reverse initial returns as occurred 
during the “bubble period” of the late 1990s (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan, 2004). Jung et al. (1996) examine both the short run and the long run market 
performance of equity issuers. They find that high Q firms earn higher announcement period 
abnormal returns than low Q firms, and that long run returns do not seem to be related to Q. 
In their view, this represents evidence against market timing. To test market timing in a 
different market and sample period, we investigate the correlation between stock returns and 
the MB ratio. 
The effect of market timing on security issuance should be conditional upon the 
degree of financial constraints. Firms that intend to issue (repurchase) equity when their 
shares are overvalued (undervalued) may only be capable of doing so if they have sufficient 
financial flexibility. This means that market timing is only possible when firms are less 
financially constrained.
5
 Therefore, if the market timing theory holds, equity valuation should 
negatively predict post-announcement stock performance, especially for financially 
unconstrained issuers. Similarly, a financially constrained firm may not be able to take on 
more debt even if its stock is undervalued. This reasoning leads to the following two 
hypotheses regarding how the effects of market timing are conditional on financial 
constraints: 
 
                                                     
5
 Contrary to our prediction, Baker et al. (2003) hypothesize and document a positive correlation between the 
effect of misvaluation on corporate investment and the degree of financial constraints. However, there are 
reasons to argue that this relationship may not be general. For example, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2007) 
determine that this relation depends upon the type of corporate investment. In particular, they find that the 
misvaluation effect on research and development (R&D) investment is much stronger among unconstrained 
firms. 
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Hypothesis 1: Post-announcement excess returns should be decreasing in the 
market-to-book ratio for equity issuers, especially when firms are not 
financially constrained. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms are more likely to issue (repurchase) equity when their 
stock is overvalued (undervalued), especially when they are not financially 
constrained. 
 
Hypothesis 1, if confirmed, should help to rule out rational theory interpretations as 
opposed to market timing. According to investment-based rational theories (Carlson et al, 
2006; Li et al, 2009), firms exercise growth options through equity issuance and post-issue 
stock returns should be lower due to a decrease in firm risk as risky growth options are 
converted into less risky assets. However, these rational theories do not have an implication 
on the interaction between abnormal stock performance and financial constraints. Hypothesis 
2 offers a further empirical prediction about the interaction between market timing and 
financial constraints. 
 
2. Pecking Order 
According to the pecking order hypothesis (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999), different ways of raising capital are associated with different levels 
of financing costs.
6
 As a result, there is a financing hierarchy that firms will follow, where 
                                                     
6
 As mentioned in Footnote 2, the pecking order model that we are testing is based on the original Donaldson 
(1961) version, which is more general than the information asymmetry version of Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Specifically, our version of the pecking order theory says that firms should prefer debt over equity financing 
unless they are financially constrained. Unlike the Myers and Majluf (1984) version, the Donaldson (1961) 
version of the pecking order is not necessarily inconsistent with the irrational framework. For example, Baker, 
Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) find that the pecking order is consistent with a framework in which managers are 
irrational in the sense that they are optimistic and overconfident. In such a framework, optimism predicts a 
pecking order. 
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internal financing (retained earnings) will be used first, followed by external debt-like 
financing. Equity financing will only be used when firms are financially constrained and 
cannot take up any additional leverage. Furthermore, the effect of the pecking order may be 
conditional upon equity valuation. If the firm’s shares are overvalued, the incentive to issue 
overvalued equity may dominate any effect suggested by the pecking order. Put differently, a 
financially unconstrained firm is expected to use debt financing according to the pecking 
order, but if the firm is overvalued, it may choose to issue equity instead. This implies: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher degree of financial constraint increases the probability 
of issuing equity, especially when firms are undervalued. 
 
II. Data and Definitions of Variables 
A. Sample Construction 
We analyze three types of public security issues or repurchases in the Canadian 
market from 1998 to 2007: 1) debt (bond) issues, 2) seasoned equity issues, and 3) share 
repurchases (equity withdrawal). The data on the new issues is gathered from the Securities 
and Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database and matched with WorldScope accounting 
data, as well as stock price and market value of equity data from Datastream.
7
 After we have 
eliminated issues or repurchases with incomplete information, as well as all financial firms 
(standard industrial classification (SIC) 6000-6999), we are left with 227 corporate debt 
issues (made by 64 different companies), 1,271 corporate equity issues (made by 664 
different companies), and 1,071 intended share repurchases (made by 447 different 
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 Note that availability of data refers to a particular company being listed in Datastream and not to the actual 
accounting numbers per se. Therefore, the number of companies in tables of descriptive statistics and regression 
tables might be different depending upon the availability of data for the variables used in the analysis. 
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companies). We gather data on analysts' forecasts from the I/B/E/S database available 
through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
 
B. Variable Definitions 
We organize variables according to the hypotheses we develop in Section I.B. 
Specifically, we define groups of variables to test hypotheses regarding: 1) market timing and 
2) pecking order. 
 
1. Market Timing 
To test the market timing theory, we need measures of equity valuation (market-to-
book ratio, Q-ratio), as well as stock price performance measures as defined below: 
 
Market-to-book value of equity is defined as 
   
,
   
market value of equity
MB
book value of equity
  
where the market value of equity is taken five trading days prior to the 
announcement. MB is a cleaner measure of stock misvaluation than Q (defined 
below) since Q contains information about leverage that may contaminate the 
measure for misvaluation. Therefore, MB is our primary proxy for stock 
misvaluation.
8
 
 
Tobin’s Q-ratio. We use the Q-ratio as a measure of stock misvaluation 
primarily to compare with prior literature (Jung, et al., 1996). Following Baker 
et al. (2003), the Q, or market-to-book asset ratio, is defined as:  
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 See Barberis and Huang (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) for theoretical arguments 
as to why MB can measure misvaluation. 
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market value of  equity total assets book value of  equity
Q
total assets
 
  
 
Stock returns before the announcement of the security issue, CAR(-60,-2), is 
estimated using the standard market model with the total return on the TSX 
300 market index as a proxy for the market return. 
 
Stock returns at the announcement of the security issue, CAR(-1,1), is 
estimated using the standard market model with the total return on the TSX 
300 market index as a proxy for the market return. 
 
Stock returns after the announcement of the security issue, CAR(2,60), is 
estimated using the standard market model with the total return on the TSX 
300 market index as a proxy for the market return.
9
 
 
For all the market-model cumulative abnormal returns, the estimation window for the 
model parameters is (-200, -60) relative to the announcement date. In addition to the market 
model abnormal returns, we also use size and MB adjusted returns over the three event 
windows to examine market timing (see Section III.B). We expect equity issuers to have 
significantly higher MB ratios than debt issuers or share repurchasers. Moreover, stock 
returns after the announcement of the issue are expected to be decreasing in market-to-book 
ratios if managers time the market. 
 
2. Pecking Order and Financial Constraints Measure 
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 We use a (2,60) window to measure long run returns in order to minimize the influence of non-issuance 
events, to reduce the effect of using alternative benchmark long run returns, and to preserve the sample size. 
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In testing all of our hypotheses, we employ a comprehensive measure of financial 
constraints, the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index. The KZ-index is constructed based on the 
coefficients of the restricted ordered logit model. The original, five variable version of the 
index has been used in past studies as a measure of financial constraints (Lamont, Polk, and 
Sa’á-Requejo, 2001). Following Baker et al. (2003), we exclude the Tobin’s Q-ratio from the 
index, as a high Q ratio may indicate overvaluation, thus contaminating the index as a 
measure of financial constraints. Therefore, we construct the KZ-index as: 
 
1 1 1
1.002 3.319 39.368 1.315 .it it itit it
it t it
CF DIV CASH
KZ LEV
TA TA TA  
                                (1) 
 
CF represents the sum of net income and depreciation, TA symbolizes total assets, LEV is 
leverage as long-term debt over lagged total assets, and CASH is cash and short-term 
investments. The KZ-index is higher for firms that are more financially constrained since 
such firms have exhausted their debt capacity (high leverage), have low cash balances or cash 
flows from operations, and pay low or no dividends. Hypothesis 3 implies that the probability 
of issuing equity should be increasing in the value of KZ. More financially constrained firms 
are forced to issue equity, especially when firms have low MB. 
We also present statistics of the component variables of the KZ-index, along with firm 
size: 
 
Leverage is defined as: .
net income depreciation
LEV
total assets

   
Cash flow is defined relative to total assets as:  
.
net income depreciation
CFA
total assets

  
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Payout is defined as cash dividends relative to the assets: 
.
cash dividends
DIVA
total assets
  
Slack is defined as: .
cash and quivalents
SLACK
total assets
   
Firm size is defined as the logarithmic value of total assets, where we deflated 
the value of total assets with the consumer price index ( 1997 100CPI  ): 
LNTA=log(deflated total assets). In some tests we also use the logarithm of the 
market value of equity to measure size. 
 
Firms with low internally generated funds (low free cash flow), low debt capacity (high 
leverage), and high financial constraints (low payout, low slack) are supposed to be more 
likely to issue equity. 
 
3. Other Variables 
Even though we don’t explicitly test for the information asymmetry model in our 
paper, we find it important to control for variables that measure information asymmetry. We 
first compute the parameter of agreement between managers and investors. This parameter 
was used by Dittmar and Thakor (2007) in their investor-manager agreement theory. This 
theory, which is closely related to the information asymmetry theory of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), states that firms issue equity when there is a high level of agreement between 
managers and investors. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) define the agreement parameter α as the 
difference between the actual (EPSa) and the last forecasted EPS (EPSf) divided by the actual 
EPS. They argue that a higher α represents higher agreement, as investors are less likely to 
question managerial decisions if managers are able to deliver better earnings than expected. 
In our view, this variable does not really measure “agreement,” but rather measures trust or 
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confidence. For this reason, we use the absolute version of alpha as our main disagreement 
variable. A higher value of absolute alpha represents less agreement since the actual EPS will 
be further from the forecasted EPS. In addition, we measure information asymmetry or 
disagreement between management and investors by the dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Higher dispersion implies higher information asymmetry or disagreement. 
 
Information asymmetry or disagreement parameter absolute alpha (| | ) 
is defined as the absolute value of the relative difference between actual 
(EPSa) and the consensus forecasted earnings per share (EPSf) just prior to the 
announcement of the security issue: .
a f
a
EPS EPS
| |=
EPS


  
 
Dispersion of analysts’ forecast is defined as the absolute value of the 
coefficient of variation of forecasted earnings for year t+1, where t is the year 
of the security issue: . 
 
A low | |  implies a low degree of information asymmetry or manager-investor 
disagreement, and a low value of DISP implies low disagreement (high agreement). We also 
define additional variables that provide information about the characteristics of the issuers 
(repurchasers): 
 
Capital expenditures is defined as the capital expenditures over the prior 
fiscal year scaled by total assets: .
capital expenditures
CAPX
total assets
   
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Relative issue size is defined as the nominal amount of funding raised with 
the issue relative to total assets: .
issue size
RISS
total assets
  Issue size is defined as 
the value of the issued security or repurchased stock, where we deflated the 
value of the issue size with the consumer price index ( 1997 100CPI  ).  
 
Tangibility is defined as: 
   
.
tangible assets PPE
TANG
total assets
   
 
Profitability is defined as: 
    
.
net income before extraordinary items
PROFIT
common equity
   
 
III. Empirical Results  
A. Sample Characteristics and Univariate Analysis 
In Table I, we present an overview of the yearly distributions of security issues and 
repurchases during the sample period 1998-2007. There is some variation in the number of 
different security issues and share repurchases over the sample period. Financing activities 
are relatively strong in the first half of the sample period followed by a drop in activity, 
especially equity issuance, around 2004, shortly after the end of the bear stock market of 
2000-2002. There is a sharp pickup in equity issuance toward the end of the sample period, so 
that the total issues reach a maximum of 339 in 2007 of which 218 are equity issues. 
 
Insert Table I about here. 
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In Table II, we present for the full sample descriptive statistics and pair-wise differences in 
means between different security types for selected characteristics that we use as proxies for 
market timing and the pecking order theories of capital structure, as well as proxies for 
disagreement between management and investors. 
 
Insert Table II about here. 
 
In Panel A, we first report characteristics and differences between different issuers related to 
market timing. When examining the differences in MB ratios, we observe that share 
repurchasers have the lowest MB (2.041), while equity issuers have the highest MB (mean 
MB of 5.300). The difference in MB between equity issuers and debt issuers and between 
equity issuers and equity repurchasers is statistically significant.
10
 
Figure 1 depicts the stock price performance for the issuers before and after the 
announcement. The sharp price run-up (run-down) leading up to the equity issuance 
(repurchase) announcement, along with the price reversal after the announcement, is highly 
suggestive of the market timing behavior of the firms. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
The pre-announcement abnormal returns (CAR(-60,-2)) for equity issuers are, on average, 8.2%, 
while for debt issuers, the abnormal returns are about zero. Equity repurchasers experience a  
-5.7% abnormal pre-announcement return. Announcement period abnormal returns (CAR(-1,1)) 
for equity issuers and debt issuers are, on average, about zero. Companies that announce 
                                                     
10
 Equity issuers and repurchasers in our Canadian sample tend to have higher MB ratios when compared to the 
international markets. Specifically, McLean, Pontiff, and Watanabe (2009) find a median log(B/M) of -0.378, 
which translates to a median MB ratio of 1.46 for all firms in their international sample of 41 non-US countries. 
This result compares with a median MB ratio of 2.795 (1.493) for equity issuers (repurchasers) for our sample.  
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share repurchase programs typically experience 1.8% higher announcement period abnormal 
returns than equity issuers. These results are mostly in line with the previous literature on the 
wealth effects associated with the announcement of different security issues.
11
 Note that the 
post-announcement abnormal returns for equity issuers are, on average, -6.2%, while that of 
repurchasers is 1.7%. We will provide multivariate tests regarding the correlation between 
post-announcement returns and the MB ratios in the next subsection. The evidence is 
consistent with previous literature on market timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) where equity 
issuers time the market and issue equity when their shares are overvalued.
12
 Next, we look at 
the variables related to the pecking order (Panel B of Table II). First, we note that our 
comprehensive measure of financial constraints, the KZ-index, is actually higher for debt 
issuers than for equity issuers and repurchasers. For example, the mean KZ is 0.405 for debt 
issuers and 0.098 for equity issuers. This evidence gives no support to the pecking order that 
firms should prefer debt to equity financing unless they are financially constrained. However, 
firm size is a determinant of the KZ-index and the MB ratio (e.g., LNTA has a correlation of 
0.101 with KZ and a correlation of -0.292 with MB in our sample). Therefore, a test of the 
pecking order and/ or market timing needs to control for the effect of size. 
Looking at the KZ components, we find that when compared to equity issuers, debt 
issuers tend to have higher leverage (LEV) and lower financial slack (SLACK). These both 
indicate higher levels of financial constraints for debt issuers. The pieces of evidence 
consistent with the pecking order theory are the fact that equity issuers are significantly 
smaller than debt issuers or firms that repurchase shares, to the extent that small firms tend to 
be more financially constrained, and that cash flows (CFA) and dividend payments (DIVA) 
                                                     
11
 Seasoned equity offerings induce the strongest negative wealth effects (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986) of between ‐2.5% and ‐4.5% for the US market, while 
debt issues induce only slightly negative wealth effects (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Eckbo, 1986). 
12
 Fama and French (2005) argue that firms repurchase shares when leverage is low and / or when investment 
opportunities lower the value of debt capacity (low Q). In our sample (see Table II) we observe that companies 
that repurchase shares have the lowest Q-ratio (mean value of 1.505) and a relatively low leverage (see Panel B 
of Table II) with a mean value of 0.291. These results are in line with the findings of Fama and French. 
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are stronger for debt issuers than for equity issuers. However, as will be demonstrated in 
Section III.C, the debt-equity choice of companies is consistent with the pecking order theory 
if we control for firm size in the analysis. 
We use two proxies to measure information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders of the firm. The results for these proxies can be found in Panel C of Table II. We 
find that equity issuers have an average absolute alpha (| | ) value of 0.576, higher than the 
average value of 0.182 for debt issuers. This result is inconsistent with the information 
asymmetry theory. Using the other proxy for information asymmetry (dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts) leads to the same conclusion. In Panel C of Table II, we also present some 
additional characteristics of the issues and issuers. Our results indicate that the average issue 
size of the debt issue is around 181 million Canadian dollars (CAD), while the average equity 
issue is around a one-third of that (60 million CAD). The average size of the share repurchase 
is around 69 million CAD. The relative issue size of equity represents, on average, around 
39% of the assets of the issuing company at the time of the issue, but only around 6% in the 
case of debt issuers. Given the costs of issuing securities and the significant difference in the 
sizes of different issuers, this is not surprising. Small equity issuers seem to issue a larger 
amount of new equity as compared to their capital. Finally, we find that equity issuers have 
more capital expenditures than both debt issuers and equity repurchasers. 
 
B. Market Timing 
In Figure 1, we observe that equity issuers experience a strong stock price run-up 
prior to the announcement of the issue when compared to debt issuers and share repurchasers 
(leverage increasing security issuance actions). This result and the significantly higher MB 
values for equity issuers provide preliminary evidence of market timing. Jung et al. (1996) 
find that announcement date excess returns are significantly lower for equity issuers with 
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lower MB, contrary to the market timing hypothesis. In contrast, we find very small 
announcement date abnormal returns for equity issuers. Since MB and associated 
misvaluation proxies may contain information about the firm’s growth prospects, we further 
investigate post-announcement excess returns for equity issuers. From Figure 1, it appears 
that equity issuers experience strong negative post-announcement returns. In Table III, we 
present the results of pre-, post-, and announcement date excess returns for equity issuers 
sorted into MB quartiles. 
 
Insert Table III about here. 
 
In Panel A of Table III, we present the results of a standard market model event study 
approach to calculate abnormal (excess) returns. First, we observe that excess returns in the 
period prior to the announcement of the issue are more positive for high MB firms (mean of 
19.81%) than for low MB firms (mean of 2.84%). This result is consistent with the prior 
literature. When we look into post-announcement excess returns, we observe just the 
opposite. Cumulative post-announcement abnormal returns are significantly higher for low 
MB firms (mean CAR(2,60) of 0.95%) than for high MB firms (mean CAR(2,60) of -14.66%). 
The result if a longer post-announcement period is considered produces a mean CAR(2,250) for 
the high MB firms of -62.58%, while it is only -12.96% for low MB firms. This difference is 
also statistically significant at the 1% level. Since the announcement-period CAR does not 
show a significant difference between high and low MB equity issuers, it seems that investors 
do not react to the announcement adequately during the announcement window. 
In order to confirm that our results are not driven by risk as measured by size and MB, 
we also perform a matching firm excess returns analysis. We use a size MB matched firms 
approach to compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) (Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 
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1999). For each calendar month, we first sort all of the firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange into deciles based on the MB ratios. Then, we match the issuing firm’s MB to a 
corresponding decile. Among the firms within the decile, we find 20 firms that are closest in 
size (size is defined as the market value of equity). The difference in buy-and-hold returns for 
a given time period between the issuing and the matching firm is a buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR). We present the results for BHAR in Panel B of Table III. For the most part, 
the results are similar to those in Panel A. Firms with higher MB have significantly higher 
pre-announcement BHARs (a difference in BHAR(-60,-2) of around 31% between the highest 
and the lowest MB quartile). In line with the findings in Panel A, announcement date excess 
returns are higher for firms with higher MB. However, the difference between the highest and 
the lowest MB quartile is not significant. Post-announcement excess returns are once again 
larger for the low MB firms. BHAR(2,60) is 4.71% larger for the lowest MB quartile firms than 
for the highest MB quartile firms. Similar to Panel A, the difference is larger when a longer 
post-event period (2,250) is considered. The difference between high MB and low MB firms 
is 7.11%, which is significant at the 10% level.
13
 Overall, the results in Table III indicate that 
while short run returns are inconclusive regarding the relationship between market 
performance and MB, the post-announcement long run returns over three months are 
consistently lower for equity issuers with high MB ratios. 
The results in Table III are consistent with the market timing hypothesis, but as 
discussed in Section I, the results are also potentially consistent with an investment-based 
rational theory. To test Hypothesis 1 and further distinguish the theories, in Table IV, we 
examine whether the correlation between the MB ratio and the post-announcement abnormal 
returns depends upon the KZ-index for equity issuers. 
                                                     
13
 Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) provide month-by-month post-issue abnormal performance of US equity 
issuers from 1975 to 1989. Interestingly, they find a positive mean size MB adjusted BHAR of 2.43% in the 
three-month period after the seasoned equity offering, compared to a mean three-month BHAR of -0.75% for 
equity issuers in our sample. They observe a one-year BHAR of -2.29% , which is similar to our one-year 
BHAR of -2.58%. 
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Insert Table IV about here. 
 
The most interesting result from Panel A of Table IV is that the least financially 
constrained firms (lowest KZ quartile) have the most negative post-announcement abnormal 
returns. These returns are calculated using the market model. The difference between the 
highest and the lowest MB quartiles is a statistically significant -30.17% for the least 
constrained quartile. Moreover, the equity issuers that are both in the lowest KZ quartile and 
in the highest MB quartile have the lowest post-announcement abnormal return of all 
companies (-26.22%). Panel B reports that this pattern is even clearer when using buy-and-
hold abnormal returns rather than abnormal returns from the market model. Again, the least 
financially constrained firms that have the highest MB ratio demonstrate the most negative 
abnormal return (-12.42%). Within this quartile, the difference between the highest and the 
lowest MB ratio is -11.21%, significantly different from zero. These results based on 
portfolio sorts provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 1. 
Next, we perform a cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis in order to provide 
a more robust test of the market timing hypothesis. We estimate the following model for the 
sample of equity issuers:
14
 
(2,60), 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ,i i i i i i i i iR MB LNMV KZ KZ MB | | CAPX                           (2) 
where R(2,60),i denotes post-announcement excess returns from Day 2 to Day 60 after the 
announcement, MBi is the market-to-book ratio of equity, LNMVi represents the log of the 
market value of the company, KZi  is the KZ-index of financial constraints, i iKZ MB  denotes 
the interaction term between market-to-book ratio of equity and the KZ-index, i| |  denotes 
                                                     
14
 The number of observations in these regressions is lower than the full sample size due to the requirement of 
control variables such as information asymmetry proxies.  
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the absolute value of the agreement proxy, CAPXi  represents the capital expenditures over 
the total assets of the firm, and iε  denotes an error term.
15
 We include CAPX in the regression 
to see whether the market performance of equity issuers is affected by capital expenditures 
since CAPX has been found to be related to stock returns (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004; Polk 
and Sapienza, 2009). We present the regression results in Table V. 
 
Insert Table V about here. 
 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the post-announcement excess return based on 
the market model (CAR(2,60),i), while in Panel B, the dependent variable is the size and 
market-to-book matched buy-and-hold post-announcement excess return (BHAR(2,60),i). The 
two models differ in that Model 2 includes an interaction variable between KZ and MB. In 
both models in Panel A, the overvaluation proxy MB significantly negatively affects post-
announcement excess returns. More importantly, in Model 2, the interactive variable between 
KZ and MB is positive and significant at the 5% level. The net effect of MB on the market 
model excess return is MB (-0.0132 + 0.0073 KZ) and is negative only when KZ is lower 
than 1.81. This result indicates that the MB effect on long run returns is stronger when KZ is 
lower. Stated differently, firms are more likely to time equity issuance when they are least 
financially constrained, consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
In Panel B where the dependent variable is the style-adjusted long run return, the MB 
ratio is significant only when the interaction between KZ and MB is included. In other words, 
when using style-adjusted returns to measure market timing, firms time their issuance only 
when they are financially unconstrained. Also, the finding that CAPX does not explain the 
poor post-announcement performance of equity issuers is consistent with the conclusion of 
                                                     
15
 Post-announcement excess return is based both on the market model (CAR(2,60)) and on the size and market-
to-book matched buy-and-hold post-announcement excess return (BHAR(2,60)). 
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Hertzel and Li (2010). Since we measure post-announcement performance over a relatively 
short window of three months, it is unlikely that our results are influenced by the choice of 
return benchmarks or non-issuance related events. Table V indicates that firms that issue 
overvalued equity (high MB) seem to time the market, where managers take advantage of the 
overvaluation by issuing equity. These results support Hypothesis 1 and provide a challenge 
for the investment-based rational theory. 
The finding that MB negatively predicts post-announcement returns for equity issuers 
tends to hold when we extend the post-announcement long run return horizon to one year, 
although the interaction term MB.KZ loses significance in the one-year return regression. We 
have also run a regression (not reported) where both equity issuers and repurchasers are 
included. When we add a dummy for repurchasers in that regression, we find that it is 
significantly positive (at the 10% level) suggesting that repurchasers, as a group, outperform 
equity issuers.
16
 
As a robustness check, we also run the same regression of CAR(2,60) for a set of 
matching firms (matched on size and MB) that do not issue or repurchase. In line with 
Hypothesis 1, we find that the coefficient for the interaction variable KZ.MB is insignificant 
for matching firm abnormal returns.
17
 
In order to provide further confirmation that market timing is stronger among 
financially unconstrained firms, we separate the sample into two subsamples based on the 
KZ-index and run long run return regressions separately. Table VI reports the regression 
results for the low KZ (unconstrained) and high KZ (constrained) subsample. 
 
                                                     
16
 Although it is not a test of Hypothesis 1, in unreported results, we run abnormal return regressions for equity 
repurchasers and find an insignificant coefficient of MB for abnormal returns. This result is in line with the 
findings of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2011). They find that overpricing is more prevalent than underpricing as 
it is easier to buy underpriced securities than to sell overpriced securities due to the reluctance of investors to 
short sell. This result, in turn, implies that the short leg is more profitable than the long leg. 
17
 The t-statistic for the interaction variable KZ.MB is only 0.22. Also, MB is insignificant for matching firm 
abnormal returns. More detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Insert Table VI about here. 
 
Consistent with the findings from Table V, MB is negative and significant at the 1% 
level for both the market model abnormal returns (Panel A) and the style-adjusted abnormal 
returns (Panel B). These results indicate that among low KZ (unconstrained) firms, post-
announcement returns are lower for high MB issuers. In contrast, MB is not significant for 
the high KZ subsample in both panels. These findings corroborate the conclusion that 
financial flexibility enables firms to select when to raise financing and which security to 
issue. 
Our last piece of evidence on market timing (regarding Hypothesis 2) and the 
evidence regarding the pecking order (Hypothesis 3) come from a multinomial choice 
analysis, which is discussed below in Section IIIC. 
 
C. Choice Model Analysis and Pecking Order 
Given that many firm characteristics depend on the size of the company, we turn to a 
multivariate choice model analysis. We estimate a multinomial probit model where 
companies can simultaneously decide on two distinct securities: 1) equity and 2) debt. In 
addition, companies can also repurchase stock, which is similar to increasing leverage. We 
use a multinomial probit model because the issue under investigation fails to satisfy the so-
called independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property of the multinomial logit 
model. If any of the security types is taken away as a possibility, the choice between the 
remaining two is not unaffected as companies that considered issuing the withdrawn security 
type will not proportionally redistribute themselves among the remaining alternatives. If, for 
example, the choice set is narrowed down by removing the equity issue, we can expect more 
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of the potential equity issuers to decide to issue debt than to repurchase stocks. Therefore, we 
use a multinomial probit that does not require the IIA property.
18
 
In Table VII, we present the results of the multinomial probit regression where the 
dependent variable is a categorical variable denoting selected security type. We set equity 
issue as the base outcome and we confront the probability of issuing equity (leverage 
decreasing security decision) to the two leverage increasing security decisions: 1) debt issue 
and 2) share repurchase. We include proxies for market timing (MB) and pecking order (KZ) 
together in the regressions. We also include leverage (LEV) to control for the possible static 
trade-off effects of the capital structure. Finally, standard control variables, such as asset 
tangibility (TANG) and profitability (PROFIT) are added. All models include industry (at 
one-digit SIC code) and year dummies. 
 
Insert Table VII about here. 
 
Models 1-4 of Table VII refer to a setup where we jointly test the hypotheses using 
the KZ-index as the proxy for financial constraints. In Models 1 and 2, we use the agreement 
parameter absolute   to control for information asymmetry or (dis)agreement, while in 
Models 3 and 4, we use the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (DISP). Models 2 and 4 include 
an interaction variable between KZ and MB. 
When reviewing both panels, we note that firm size is solidly significant in affecting 
security choice. Large firms are more likely to issue debt versus equity (Panel A) and 
repurchase shares (Panel B). With respect to market timing, the overvaluation proxy MB is 
generally significant suggesting that firms tend to issue (repurchase) equity when their shares 
are overvalued (undervalued). Furthermore, when the interaction between KZ and MB is 
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 We have formally tested whether the multinomial logit model assures the IIA and different tests find that the 
IIA property is often violated. 
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included as in Models 2 and 4, MB is always significant at the 5% level or above. Noting that 
the sign of MB is negative and that of KZ·MB is positive for both panels, this result is similar 
to that reported in the long run return test of Table V that the effect of MB on equity issuance 
is stronger among low KZ firms.
19
 These findings are supportive of Hypothesis 2. Taken 
together, there is consistent evidence that the effect of market timing is conditional on 
financial constraints, and firms are more likely to time the market, both in issuing and 
repurchasing equity, when they are financially unconstrained. 
Next, we turn to the pecking order hypothesis that expects financially unconstrained 
firms (low KZ) to be more likely to use debt financing. Put differently, the pecking order 
predicts a negative sign on KZ. We note that in Panel A, KZ is significant at the 10% level in 
Models 1 and 3 which do not include the interaction between KZ and MB. In Models 2 and 4, 
that include the interaction, the significance level of KZ becomes stronger and is significant 
at least at the 5% level. In addition, the interaction term between KZ and MB is also 
significantly positive. Keeping in mind that the expected pecking order effect of KZ on the 
probably of debt issuance is negative according to the pecking order theory, this result 
suggests that the effect of KZ, in accordance with the pecking order, is more significant when 
MB is low or when the firm is undervalued.
20
 This lends support for Hypothesis 3. 
In Panel B of Table VII, KZ appears positive in Models 1 and 3 where the interaction 
term between KZ and MB is not included. However, when this interaction is included in 
Models 2 and 4, the significance of KZ vanishes and the interaction between KZ and MB is 
again significantly positive. The significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term 
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 It should be noted that the interpretation of the interaction term in a non-linear regression such as logit or 
probit is not straightforward. The magnitude of the interaction term is not the same as the actual interaction 
effect on the probability. See Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) for details. In unreported 
results, we conduct a two-way portfolio sorting test that is similar to the test in Table IV, and confirm that there 
exists an interaction effect between MB and KZ on the debt-equity choice decision. 
20
 Our test results are not overly sensitive to how the KZ-index is defined. In unreported tests, we calculate KZ 
using equal-weighted components so that each component variable contributes equally to the variation in KZ, 
following Baker et al. (2003) and Chang et al. (2007). Our multinomial probit test yields the same conclusions 
as Table VII. 
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KZ·MB indicates that the effect of MB on repurchase/issuance is stronger when firms have 
lower KZ (financially unconstrained). This result offers evidence of an interaction between 
market timing and financial constraints in the equity repurchase decision. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
We test the market timing and pecking order theories in a sample of Canadian firms 
from 1998 to 2007. Our most novel finding is that the effects of market timing and the 
pecking order interact. Firms are more likely to time their equity issues and repurchases when 
they are least financially constrained, and financial flexibility and stock misvaluation appear 
to jointly drive firms’ financing decisions. We find that preannouncement equity valuation 
negatively predicts post-announcement abnormal stock performance only among financially 
unconstrained firms lending stronger support for the market timing theory, but is difficult to 
explain using investment-based rational theory. In contrast, the pecking order of financing is 
more likely to be observed among undervalued firms consistent with the interpretation that 
when firms are overvalued, the incentive for them to exploit market overvaluation may distort 
the pecking order prediction that firms prefer debt to equity. Future research that incorporates 
the interaction between market timing and financial constraints may yield more insight into 
firms’ financing policy. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Cumulative market model abnormal returns around the announcements of security issues (share repurchases). Date 0 
represents the announcement date of the security issue (share repurchase). 
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Table I. Yearly Distribution of Security Issues and Repurchases 
 
The security issuance sample is from the Securities Data Company (SDC). The sample includes debt issues, equity issues, 
and share repurchases of Canadian non-financial companies with WorldScope and Datastream coverage from 1998 to 2007. 
Numbers in cells represent the number of issues in a given year. 
 
 Year 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Debt 34 34 33 32 20 19 10 19 15 14 227 
Equity 90 116 121 102 112 115 86 116 195 218 1,271 
Repurchase 147 138 175 128 103 39 68 80 83 110 1,071 
Total 271 288 329 262 235 173 164 215 293 339 2,569 
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Table II. Summary Statistics of Proxies for Market Timing, Pecking Order, and Control 
Variables 
 
The sample includes debt and equity issues and share repurchases of Canadian non-financial companies from 1998 to 2007. 
Mean, median and number of observations (N) are for market-adjusted stock price returns prior to the announcement (CAR(-
60,-2)), market-adjusted stock returns around the announcement (CAR(-1,1)), market-adjusted stock price returns after the 
announcement (CAR(2,60)), Tobin’s Q-ratio (Q), market-to-book ratio of equity (MB), size (LNTA = log of deflated total 
assets; deflator 1998 = 100), leverage (LEV), cash flow (CFA), payout (DIVA), slack (SLACK), KZ – an index that 
measures the degree of financial constraints [see Equation (1)], dispersion of analysts' forecasts (DISP), the absolute value of 
the disagreement proxy , issue size (PRINC), relative issue size (RISS), capital expenditures scaled by totals assets 
(CAPX), tangibility (TANG) and return on equity (PROFIT). Total assets always refer to the book value of assets. All 
variables except LNTA and RISS are winsorized at 2.5% of top and bottom values. 
 
Panel A. Proxies for Market Timing 
Security  CAR(-60,-2) CAR(-1,1) CAR(2,60) Q MB 
Debt Mean 0.002 0.001 -0.013 1.498 2.599 
 Median -0.003 0.000 0.000 1.409 2.123 
 N 224 224 224 216 216 
       
Equity Mean 0.082*** -0.005 -0.062*** 5.272 5.300 
 Median 0.045*** -0.013*** -0.054*** 1.955 2.795 
 N 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,078 1,080 
       
Repurchase Mean -0.057*** 0.013*** 0.017** 1.437 2.041 
 Median -0.061*** 0.006*** 0.010* 1.206 1.493 
 N 1,033 1,033 1,033 941 941 
       
Difference Debt-Equity -0.081*** 0.006* 0.049*** -3.774*** -2.701*** 
 Repurchase-Equity -0.139*** 0.018*** 0.079*** -3.835*** -3.259*** 
 Debt-Repurchase 0.059*** -0.012*** -0.030** 0.061 0.557*** 
Panel B. Proxies for Pecking Order 
Security  LNTA LEV CFA DIVA SLACK KZ 
Debt Mean 15.161 0.438 0.100 0.022 0.061 0.405 
 Median 15.225 0.451 0.096 0.015 0.026 0.713 
 N 219 210 216 219 219 210 
        
Equity Mean 11.267 0.236 -0.091 0.014 0.195 0.098 
 Median 11.189 0.183 0.028 0.000 0.089 0.221 
 N 1,127 1,061 1,075 1,056 1,092 986 
        
Repurchase Mean 12.604 0.291 0.101 0.010 0.127 0.285 
 Median 12.404 0.296 0.106 0.000 0.044 0.447 
 N 963 936 941 934 935 904 
        
Difference Debt-Equity 3.893*** 0.201*** 0.191*** 0.008*** -0.134*** 0.307*** 
 Repurchase-Equity 1.336*** 0.055*** 0.192*** -0.004** -0.068*** 0.187*** 
 Debt-Repurchase 2.557*** 0.146*** 0.000 0.011*** -0.066*** 0.120* 
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Table II. Summary Statistics of Proxies for Market Timing, Pecking Order, and Control Variables (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Other Characteristics 
Security  DISP |α| PRINC RISS CAPX TANG PROFIT 
Debt Mean 0.098 0.182 180.756 0.056 0.100 0.587 0.131 
 Median 0.040 0.071 150.000 0.028 0.088 0.583 0.133 
 N 148 153 227 219 219 219 219 
         
Equity Mean 0.342 0.576 59.605 0.388 0.152 0.498 -0.164 
 Median 0.182 0.304 22.113 0.211 0.084 0.521 0.068 
 N 499 618 1,271 1,127 1,116 1,123 1,075 
         
Repurchase Mean 0.174 0.454 68.781 0.052 0.097 0.422 0.097 
 Median 0.083 0.171 5.669 0.031 0.061 0.392 0.091 
 N 547 643 1,067 960 960 961 945 
         
Difference Debt-Equity -0.244*** -0.393*** 121.151*** -0.332*** -0.052*** 0.089*** 0.296*** 
 Repurchase-Equity -0.168*** -0.122*** 9.176 -0.335*** -0.055*** -0.077*** 0.261*** 
 Debt-Repurchase -0.076*** -0.271*** 111.975*** 0.003 0.002 0.165*** -0.035** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table III. Market Timing and Excess Returns 
 
This table reports Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Panel A) and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (Panel B) for non-financial 
equity issuers in Canada from 1998 to 2007. Pre-announcement market-adjusted stock returns (CAR(-60,-2)), announcement-
period market-adjusted stock returns (CAR(-1,1)) and post-announcement market-adjusted stock returns (CAR(2,60),CAR(2,250)) 
for equity issuers are sorted according to market-to-book quartiles. The CARs in Panel A are computed using the standard 
market model, where the market return is represented as a total return on the TSX 300 index. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) in Panel B represent size-MB matched firm abnormal returns. Tests of significance of the excess returns are 
performed for the difference in means only. 
 
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Market Model) 
MB Quartile  CAR(-60,-2) CAR(-1,1) CAR(2,60) CAR(2,250) 
1 Mean 0.0284 0.0014 0.0095 -0.1296 
 Median 0.0173 -0.0080 -0.0021 -0.0856 
 N 263 263 263 263 
      
2 Mean 0.0291 -0.0063 -0.0331 -0.2014 
 Median 0.0059 -0.0097 -0.0263 -0.1481 
 N 261 261 261 261 
      
3 Mean 0.0854 -0.0103 -0.0757 -0.3624 
 Median 0.0828 -0.0153 -0.0761 -0.2999 
 N 261 261 261 261 
      
4 Mean 0.1981 -0.0001 -0.1466 -0.6258 
 Median 0.1026 -0.0195 -0.1659 -0.5325 
 N 259 259 259 259 
      
Total Mean 0.0849 -0.0038 -0.0612 -0.3291 
 Median 0.0517 -0.0127 -0.0566 -0.2738 
 N 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 
      
Difference in means (Q4-Q1) 0.1697*** -0.0015 -0.1561*** -0.4963*** 
t-stat 3.83 -0.14 -4.32 -5.07 
Panel B. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (Size-MB Adjusted Returns) 
MB Quartile  BHAR(-60,-2) BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(2,60) BHAR(2,250) 
1 Mean -0.0028 -0.0028 0.0248 0.0231 
 Median 0.0016 -0.0127 -0.0039 0.0287 
 N 240 240 240 240 
      
2 Mean 0.0324 -0.0054 -0.0085 -0.0205 
 Median 0.0058 -0.0142 -0.0091 -0.0069 
 N 269 269 269 269 
      
3 Mean 0.1056 -0.0090 -0.0207 -0.0524 
 Median 0.0660 -0.0145 -0.0102 -0.0266 
 N 269 269 269 269 
      
4 Mean 0.3084 0.0044 -0.0233 -0.0480 
 Median 0.1965 -0.0128 -0.0627 -0.0811 
 N 266 266 266 266 
      
Total Mean 0.1135 -0.0032 -0.0075 -0.0258 
 Median 0.0632 -0.0133 -0.0176 -0.0199 
 N 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 
      
Difference in means (Q4-Q1) 0.3113*** 0.0072 -0.0471 -0.0711* 
t-stat 8.31 0.70 -1.60 -1.74 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table IV. Financial Constraints, (Over)Valuation and Post-Announcement Excess Returns 
 
This table reports Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Panel A) and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (Panel B) for non-financial 
equity issuers in Canada from 1998 to 2007. Post-announcement market-adjusted stock returns (CAR(2,60)) for equity issuers 
are tabulated according to market-to-book quartiles and financial constraint quartiles as measured with the KZ-index [see 
Equation (1)]. The CARs in Panel A are computed using the standard market model, where the market return is represented 
as a total return on the TSX 300 index. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in Panel B represent size-MB matched firm 
abnormal returns. 
 
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Market Model) 
MB 
Quartiles 
 KZ quartiles Total Q4-Q1 t-stat 
 1 2 3 4 
1 Mean 0.0395 -0.1308 0.0663 0.0504 0.0204 0.0109 0.18 
 N 50 42 71 71 234   
         
2 Mean -0.0103 -0.0216 0.0043 -0.1049 -0.0274 -0.0946* -1.90 
 N 65 62 61 44 232   
         
3 Mean -0.0750 -0.0868 -0.0570 -0.0581 -0.0695 0.0170 0.31 
 N 52 68 49 75 244   
         
4 Mean -0.2622 -0.0953 -0.0533 -0.0806 -0.1304 0.1816*** 2.57 
 N 63 62 53 41 219   
         
Total Mean -0.0831 -0.0797 -0.0028 -0.0376 -0.0507 0.0455 1.47 
 N 230 234 234 231 929   
         
Q4-Q1 -0.3017*** 0.0355 -0.1196 -0.1310** -0.1508***   
t-stat -4.49 0.53 -1.28 -2.04 -3.94   
Panel B. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (Size-MB Matched Returns) 
MB 
Quartiles 
 KZ quartiles Total Q4-Q1 t-stat 
 1 2 3 4 
1 Mean -0.0121 -0.0895 0.0919 0.0797 0.0297 0.0918** 2.14 
 N 50 44 68 62 224   
         
2 Mean -0.0094 0.0024 -0.0106 -0.0353 -0.0115 -0.0259 -0.64 
 N 66 63 62 45 236   
         
3 Mean -0.0490 -0.0248 -0.0128 0.0024 -0.0192 0.0514 1.21 
 N 53 69 50 76 248   
         
4 Mean -0.1242 0.0009 0.0431 0.0370 -0.0186 0.1612*** 2.58 
 N 66 63 56 41 226   
         
Total Mean -0.0512 -0.0228 0.0312 0.0226 -0.0054 0.0737*** 3.06 
 N 235 239 236 224 934   
         
Q4-Q1 -0.1121** 0.0905 -0.0488 -0.0427 -0.0483   
t-stat -2.18 1.48 -0.64 -0.77 -1.53   
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table V. Post-Announcement Excess Returns and Company Characteristics 
 
This table reports estimation results for the OLS regression model [see Equation (2)] for Canadian non-financial equity 
issuers. The dependent variable is either the post-announcement market-adjusted stock return (CAR(2,60)) in Panel A or size-
MB matched buy-and-hold excess stock return (BHAR(2,60)) in Panel B. Explanatory variables are equity market-to-book 
ratio (MB), size of the company (LNMV = logarithm of the market value of equity measured five days prior to the 
announcement of the issue), the KZ-index of financial constraints [see Equation (1)], the interaction term between equity 
market-to-book ratio and the KZ-index, the absolute value of the agreement parameter (|α|), and capital expenditures scaled 
by total assets (CAPX). All variables except LNMV are winsorized at 2.5% of the top and bottom values. Standard errors in 
the regressions are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected. 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable is the Post-Announcement Market-Adjusted Stock Return CAR(2,60) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
MB -0.0096** -2.12 -0.0132*** -2.61 
LNMV -0.0285** -2.51 -0.0274** -2.47 
KZ 0.0062 0.62 -0.0145 -1.17 
KZ·MB   0.0073** 1.98 
|α| -0.0252 -1.11 -0.0291 -1.27 
CAPX 0.0256 0.28 0.0326 0.36 
Intercept 0.2748* 2.18 0.2990** 2.42 
N 548 548 
Adj. R2 0.039 0.055 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Panel B. Dependent Variable is the Post-Announcement Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return BHAR(2,60) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
MB -0.0046 -1.24 -0.0074* -1.74 
LNMV -0.0218*** -2.52 -0.0206** -2.41 
KZ 0.0229*** 2.96 0.0057 0.60 
KZ·MB   0.0059* 1.94 
|α| -0.0188 -1.00 -0.0208 -1.10 
CAPX -0.0948 -1.27 -0.0895 -1.19 
Intercept 0.0705 0.76 0.0834 0.92 
N 555 555 
Adj. R2 0.021 0.035 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table VI. Post-Announcement Excess Returns and Company Characteristics for the Low and 
High Financially Constrained Subsample 
 
This table presents estimation results for the OLS regression model [see Equation (2)] for Canadian non-financial equity 
issuers. The dependent variable is either the post-announcement market-adjusted stock return (CAR(2,60)) in Panel A or size-
MB matched buy-and-hold excess stock return (BHAR(2,60)) in Panel B. Explanatory variables are equity market-to-book 
ratio (MB), size of the company (LNMV = logarithm of the market value of equity measured five days prior to the 
announcement of the issue), the KZ-index of financial constraints [see Equation (1)], the interaction term between equity 
market-to-book ratio and the KZ-index, the absolute value of the disagreement parameter (|α|), and capital expenditures 
scaled by total assets (CAPX). All variables except LNMV are winsorized at 2.5% of the top and bottom values. Standard 
errors in the regressions are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected. 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable is the Post-Announcement Market-Adjusted Stock Return CAR(2,60) 
 Low KZ High KZ 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
MB -0.0184*** -2.70 -0.0014 -0.27 
LNMV -0.0158 -0.97 -0.0340** -2.19 
KZ 0.0048 0.32 -0.1164* -1.96 
|α| -0.0482 -1.45 0.0067 0.20 
CAPX 0.3437** 2.62 -0.4011* -3.29 
Intercept 0.0575 0.38 0.5089** 2.44 
N 287 261 
Adj. R2 0.108 0.036 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Panel B. Dependent Variable is the Post-Announcement Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return BHAR(2,60) 
 Low KZ High KZ 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
MB -0.0111* -1.92 0.0014 0.30 
LNMV 0.0111 0.83 -0.0448*** -4.07 
KZ 0.0228 1.84 -0.0696 -1.27 
|α| -0.0314 -1.16 -0.0036 -0.14 
CAPX 0.1068 0.98 -0.3810*** -3.73 
Intercept -0.0263 -0.21 0.4530*** 2.73 
N 294 261 
Adj. R2 0.064 0.042 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table VII. Multinomial Probit Regressions for the Determinants of Security Issuance Choice 
 
The sample includes Canadian debt and equity issues and share repurchases from 1998 to 2007 made by non-financial companies. The dependent variable takes value of zero for equity issues 
and a value of one for straight debt issues in Panel A and share repurchases in Panel B. In all the models, the base security choice is equity issue. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
consistent. Explanatory variables are size of the company (LNTA - logarithm of total assets), equity market-to-book ratio (MB), the KZ-index of financial constraints [see Equation (1)], the 
interaction term between equity market-to-book ratio and the KZ-index, dispersion of analysts' forecasts (DISP), the absolute value of the disagreement parameter (|α|), leverage (LEV), 
tangibility of assets (TANG), and return on equity (PROFIT). All variables except LNTA are winsorized at 2.5% of top and bottom values. 
 
   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
  Coef. z-stat  Coef. z-stat  Coef. z-stat  Coef. z-stat 
Panel A. Debt (1) versus Equity (0) 
LNTA  0.7888*** 10.48  0.7941*** 10.64  0.8383*** 10.84  0.8458*** 10.95 
MB  -0.0136* -1.78  -0.0525*** -2.68  -0.0086 -1.10  -0.0475** -2.27 
KZ  -0.1429* -1.75  -0.2965*** -2.79  -0.1638** -1.96  -0.3164*** -2.81 
KZ·MB     0.0595** 2.21     0.0607** 2.06 
|α|  -0.4502* -1.84  -0.4611* -1.89       
DISP        -1.1420* -1.95  -1.1728** -1.97 
LEV  -0.0014 -0.00  -0.1749 -0.23  -0.0640 -0.08  -0.2738 -0.33 
TANG  0.3242 0.70  0.3412 0.73  0.2880 0.57  0.2748 0.54 
PROFIT  0.0006 0.12  0.0003 0.07  0.0023 0.30  0.0013 0.22 
Intercept  -12.2601*** -10.01  -12.2241*** -10.02  -12.9181*** -10.25  -12.9093*** -10.26 
Panel B. Repurchase (1) versus Equity (0) 
LNTA  0.2354*** 6.12  0.2412*** 6.25  0.2819*** 6.47  0.2888*** 6.57 
MB  -0.0321 -1.53  -0.0582** -1.96  -0.0210 -1.19  -0.0504* -1.93 
KZ  0.1254** 2.13  0.0143 0.20  0.1803*** 2.64  0.0531 0.64 
KZ·MB     0.0413*** 2.81     0.0486*** 2.79 
|α|  -0.1265 -1.47  -0.1323 -1.52       
DISP        -0.2629** -2.06  -0.2653** -2.09 
LEV  -2.0116*** -4.16  -2.2080*** -4.69  -2.5442*** -4.23  -2.7839*** -4.57 
TANG  0.0358 0.12  0.0424 0.14  -0.0214 -0.06  -0.0402 -0.12 
PROFIT  0.2990** 2.34  0.2947** 2.29  0.3144* 1.78  0.3137* 1.75 
Intercept  -0.7592 -1.39  -0.7403 -1.33  -1.2888** -2.11  1.2791** -2.07 
N  1,283  1,283  1,093  1,093 
Industry Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Time Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Pseudo R2  0.284  0.288  0.278  0.283 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
